Although rarely examined together, Elie Wiesel's The Trial of God and Albert Camus's The Plague are distinct, but philosophically related projects. Both respond to the moral crisis that culminated in widespread fascism and genocide in Europe prior to and during World War II by claiming that humanity must struggle against absurdity to make its own meaning, even in the face of profound and meaningless suffering. This essay argues that without such meaning, there can be no truly shared, universal ethics. Wiesel and Camus successfully make a similar claim not by asserting the world has become absurd, but by claiming that it has always been absurd. Both assert that we can ease human suffering by adopting an ethics that operates in spite of the constant uncertainty caused by absurdity.
I want to blaspheme, and I can't quite manage it. I go up against
For Elie Wiesel and Albert Camus, the absurdity of the world and the intrinsic meaninglessness it might indicate point to man's unbreachable loneliness, but not necessarily to his fundamental inability to communicate. The patent absurdity of human experience indicates to them that, to confront the moral abyss revealed by totalitarianism, fascism, and unspeakable human suffering, humanity must create its own meaning in the face of the absurd. What I wish to argue is that, without that meaning, there can be no shared ethics. When the "silence of the world," as Camus would say, or "the silence of God," from Wiesel's perspective, is met with mankind's sincere interrogation and protest, hope is possible, even if concrete answers are not forthcoming. This essay explores the ways Wiesel's The Trial of God and Camus's The Plague contribute to distinct, though philosophically related, projects. They are related in that both aim to rescue ethics from traditional metaphysics as well as from the ideological malaise and loss of innocence that define life after Auschwitz. They do this most successfully not by denying that the world is absurd, but rather by asserting wholeheartedly that it has always been absurd.3
In 1949, Theodor Adorno famously proclaimed that "to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric."4 By 1966, though, Adorno's feelings began to change. "Ceaseless suffering," he explained then, "has as much right to express itself as does the victim of torture to screaming. Therefore it may have been false [on my part] to say that after Auschwitz one cannot write poetry. But it is not false to ask . . . whether after Auschwitz it is possible to live at all; whether . . . [one] who escaped by accident and who by every logic should have been murdered" can
